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Global Reform of Personal Income Taxation, 1981-2005: 
Evidence from 189 Countries 
 
In this paper we use a panel of 189 countries to describe the salient trends that have 
emerged in national personal income tax systems spanning the twenty five year period from 
1981 to 2005. Using complete national income tax schedules, we calculate actual average 
and marginal tax rates at different income levels as well as time-varying measures of 
structural progressivity and complexity of national tax systems. We show that frequent 
alterations of tax structures have reduced tax rates at higher levels of income and diminished 
the overall progressivity and complexity of national tax systems; however, the degree of this 
change varies considerably across countries. We also find that the relationship between the 
tax rates and revenue is positive for high income countries; however, the strength of the 
relationship declines with weaker institutions and lower levels of economic development. 
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1. Introduction 
About one hundred years ago, Seligman (1908) observed that “the tendency toward 
progressive taxation is almost everywhere on the increase”.  However, income tax progressivity 
at the beginning of the 20
th century was rather moderate by contemporary standards.  The top 
personal income tax (PIT) rate in 15 surveyed countries hardly exceeded 10%.  “The highest 
point known to history as actually enforced is thirty-seven and a half percent”, which lasted only 
a year in Holland in 1796.  Referring to this case, Seligman remarks “the progression was so 
severe as to become a confiscation”.  
By 1981, the 37.5% top PIT rate was no longer the highest historical point – 4 of every 5 
country had the top PIT rate exceeding 37.5%, with the maximum of 90% in Iran.  The GDP-
weighted average top statutory marginal PIT rate was 62% among 108 countries.  National PIT 
systems were frequently plagued by multiple tax schedules, complicated tax formulas, 
surcharges, numerous exemptions, and escalating highly-partitioned tax scales.   
However, many governments made significant changes to their national PIT systems, 
since 1981.  The GDP-weighted average top statutory marginal PIT rate fell from 62% in 1981 to 
42.9% in 1991 and by 2005 reached a twenty five year low of 36.4%.  There was also a sizeable 
drop in marginal and average PIT rates at higher levels of individual income and an overall 
decline in structural progressivity of the PIT systems.  We observe a growing trend toward the 
use of one-rate flat personal income taxation
1 and find some evidence of the increased simplicity 
of several characteristics of the PIT structure.  It is apparent that the current tax rates are lower 
while tax structures are flatter and, to a certain degree, simpler than they were 25 years ago. 
                                                 
1 Although this trend is more popular among transitional countries at the moment, there is ongoing debate in other 
parts of the world about the merits of making the switch (Paulus and Peichl 2008).     3
This study adds to the taxation literature by providing a careful methodological 
documentation of the changes that have taken place in personal income taxation over the last 25 
years.  The analysis we provide is important for a number of reasons.  First, the coverage of the 
analysis is unprecedented as we describe the changes that have taken place in almost 190 
countries worldwide.  Relying on such a large panel of countries means that the trends we 
describe are not likely to suffer from a sample selection bias.  More importantly, we are able to 
document the variation in the personal income tax (PIT) evolution across countries at different 
stages of economic development.   
Second, we calculate and analyze the time varying marginal and average tax rates at 
different points of the income scale.  These tax measures represent a significant improvement 
over the commonly used top statutory PIT rate.  The existence of deductions, allowances, tax 
credits, surtaxes, and local taxes means that there is often a big difference between the effective 
and statutory tax rates.  This, along with excessive income inequality, implies that the top rate 
does not apply to most individuals in many countries.  We address this issue by using more 
common levels of earned income in calculating tax rates and by making adjustments for 
deductions, allowances, tax credits, and other legal rules.  As such, our tax rate measures are 
much closer to the actual rates that individuals are supposed to pay.   
Third, the unique information we collected allows us to identify the long-term trends in 
such important features of national PIT systems as progressivity and complexity.  Our 
progressivity measure is the progression slope of either average or marginal rates along the 
income scale, which is calculated for each country and year using 100 data points that are formed 
around the country’s GDP per capita.  This measure has been trending downward in every 
country category, with the exception of low income countries.  We also summarize the trends in   4
several observable dimensions of the PIT complexity, including the complexity of allowances 
and tax credits, the use of multiple tax schedules, non-standard tax formulas, local taxes, national 
surtaxes, and the number of PIT brackets.   
Fourth, the existing measures of PIT rates are generally available for a cross section of 
countries at a point in time or very short panels with limited time variation.  Furthermore, the 
existing data sources usually under represent developing countries.  The coverage and 
comparability of our tax measures go a long way in filling this gap.  Because we rely on data 
from several sources, we are able to provide a greater level of consistency, both across countries 
as well as within country over time, than data from any one source.  Having a long panel is also 
useful in identifying within-country dynamics of tax measures while controlling for constant 
cross-country heterogeneity. We use a simple growth model to illustrate how having a large 
representative panel of countries with consistent time-series may have a significant impact on the 
inference and policy conclusions regarding the effect of tax rates on economic growth.  
Finally, we examine the relationship between the tax rates and collected revenue for a 
large subset of countries.  The question we are interested in is whether the reduced rates and 
progressivity had a considerable negative effect on PIT collection.  We find that the relationship 
between the tax rates and revenue is positive for high income countries; however, the strength of 
the relationship declines with weaker institutions and lower levels of economic development.  
The PIT rates do not seem to matter for revenue collection in countries with high levels of 
government corruption.   
Admittedly, we ignore other components of the tax system such as taxes on corporate 
income, domestic consumption, and international trade.  Accounting for changes in these other 
taxes is important when looking at the impact of the global reform on economic outcomes.    5
However, collecting and analyzing information on these additional components, while useful, 
would prove too monumental a task for one paper.  We leave the analysis of other components to 
future research.        
We begin by providing a quick overview of the data followed by an analysis of major 
global trends in personal income taxation, in particular, the high frequency of PIT changes, a 
ubiquitous decline in top statutory PIT rates, a downward movement in actual marginal and 
average rates at higher levels of individual income, increasing simplicity of national tax systems, 
decreasing structural PIT progressivity, and the emergence of flat rate tax schedules.  This is 
followed by an analysis of the effect these changes may have had on PIT collection.  We then 
discuss the sensitivity of estimation results to the size and composition of the sample of 
countries. 
2. Data Sources and Sample 
The data analyzed in the paper covers personal income tax structures in 189 current and 
former countries worldwide for the period 1981 to 2005.
2  As far as we know, this is the first 
panel study of this size that analyzes the historical changes that have occurred in personal 
income tax structures over the last 25 years. 
Our dataset is comprehensive and contains the complete national PIT schedules with 
statutory rates, tax brackets, country-specific tax formulas, basic allowances, standard 
deductions, tax credits, multiple tax scales, national surcharges, and local taxes.  This 
information allows us to compute several important variables including country’s statutory rates, 
number of tax brackets, actual average and marginal tax rates at different points of income 
distribution, frequency of tax changes, and various measures of PIT progressivity and 
                                                 
2 The number of countries ranges from 108 in 1981 to 180 in 2004.   6
complexity.  In the following sections we give a detailed description of each variable, including 
definitions, computation methodology, summary statistics, and trend analysis. 
This consolidated PIT dataset was assembled from more than 100 distinct reference 
books and datasets.  Of these, the most important sources are the tax anthologies published by 
international accounting firms (e.g., PricewaterhouseCoopers, Coopers and Lybrand, etc.) as well 
as publications and datasets of international organizations (e.g., International Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation, OECD, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, etc.) and public policy 
centers (such as University of Michigan’s World Tax Database (WTD), Economist Intelligence 
Unit, Heritage Foundation, and Fraser Institute).  A wide variety of data sources allows for 
significant cross checking, thus minimizing the amount of errors that one will inevitably 
encounter in a study of this magnitude.  We made every effort to reconcile contradictory 
reporting to produce a consistent series for each country across time (see Appendix 1 for the 
description of sources and data reconciliation efforts).
3  Through careful cleaning of the data, we 
have assembled a valuable consolidated personal income tax resource for scholars doing cross-
country empirical research.
4 
 One notable advantage of this consolidated dataset is that it provides a level of world 
representation that has not been attained in previous studies of tax structures.
5  Our full sample 
includes 3613 top statutory PIT rates for 189 current and former countries from 1981 to 2005.  
                                                 
3 The following examples can give a sense of inconsistencies we dealt with.  The Russian top PIT rate is coded as 
90% in the 1990 WTD while this rate was applied only to the inheritors of book writers for honorariums received.  
We had to change this rate to the second highest rate of 60% charged on incomes from individual economic activity 
that was often performed underground.  The top marginal PIT rate for Denmark rises from 22% to 68% in the 1988 
WTD while in fact it drops from 73% to 68%.  The reason for such a discrepancy is omitted surcharges and regional 
taxes prior to 1988 in WTD.  Significant inconsistencies may affect the overall trends as well as bias the estimates in 
the behavioral models based on these data.   
4 This dataset is planned to be publicly released as part of the World Tax Indicators v.1 in 2009.  
5 Some of the largest samples in earlier studies include 51 marginal PIT rates from developing countries in 1984-
1985 (Sicat and Vermani 1988) and 66 top PIT rates in 1980-1989 (Lee and Gordon 2005).
   7
This is an average of 145 countries per year.  Even in the case of highly data-demanding 
variables such as tax progressivity measures which require the complete tax schedule, we have 
non-missing values for 175 countries, or an average of 123 countries per year (from 75 in 1981 
to 157 in 2002).  To further highlight the representativeness of our sample, we note that 31% of 
the countries included are classified as high income countries, 18% as upper middle income, 
30% as lower middle income, and 22% as low income countries.
6  These countries are located in 
all populated geographic regions and continents,
7 and they represent approximately 94% of the 
world population and 98.5% of the world output (or more precisely, 86% of the world GDP in 
current U.S. dollars in 1981, 89% in 1982, 97% in 1983-1988, and 98-99% in all subsequent 
years).
8 
3. Continuous Tax Reform 
An examination of the dataset reveals a number of remarkable changes in personal 
income taxation over the last twenty five years.  The first important observation is that tax rates, 
income thresholds, and the overall tax structures are continuously changing.  The last column of 
Panel A in Table 1 shows that, on average, 45% of the countries in our sample change at least 
one element of their national tax scale (statutory rates or tax brackets) every year.  Of these 
countries, about half make full changes by altering both rates and bracket thresholds 
simultaneously.  The share of countries with full changes in PIT was particularly high in the late 
1980s relative to other periods.  We find very few cases where countries modify their statutory 
                                                 
6 Country categories are defined using the World Bank country classification based on historical (time-varying) 
income thresholds.  For example, the income thresholds used for the 2005 classification are as follows: low income, 
$875 or less, upper middle income, $876-$3465, upper middle income, $3466-$10725, and high income, $10725 or 
more. 
7 The regional breakdown is as follows:  Africa – 48 countries, Asia and Oceania – 31, Central and South America – 
35, Eurasia – 16, Europe – 43, Middle East – 12, and North America – 4.  
8 The major economies with missing PIT rates in the early 1980s are former USSR in 1981-1982 and Italy in 1981.   8
rates while maintaining old thresholds (2.7% of the sample).  However, the share of countries 
that adjust tax brackets but keep their statutory rates the same increased significantly in the early 
1990s moving from 15% in the 1986-1990 period to 21% in the 1991-1995 period.  Changes of 
this nature might be an indication that countries are increasingly adjusting their tax schedules for 
inflation. 
An investigation of these changes by country type reveals that national PIT scales are 
changing more frequently in developed countries (62% of countries in the respective category 
per year) followed by upper middle income countries (44%), lower middle income countries 
(42%), and low income countries (29%).  The significant number of developed countries that 
went through major tax reforms in the late 1980s explains the spike in the share of high income 
countries with full changes in their tax scales during the 1986-1990 period (42.7%). 
The difference between high and low income countries is especially striking with respect 
to the share of countries that alter thresholds but not rates.  From Table 1 it becomes apparent 
that most of the low income countries do not adjust their tax brackets for inflation over the whole 
considered period.
9  This is also true for the middle income countries in the 1980s.  Without such 
inflationary adjustments, the tax structure may become less equitable if taxpayers are being 
pushed into higher tax brackets with no accompanying increase in real income.  This is known as 
the “bracket creep” effect.  Even if top statutory PIT rates are falling, the core taxpayers may 
actually experience an increase in marginal rates in an inflationary environment that is 
commonly present in less developed economies.   
Apart from the inflationary adjustments, another explanation for continuous changes in 
tax rates and brackets could be that countries are simply attempting to identify the best tax 
                                                 
9 The slow adjustment of tax brackets to inflation in low income countries is likely to be related to widespread 
evasion, weak enforcement, and little revenue collected from personal income tax.   9
structure.  Identifying the best tax structure, however, is a normative matter, which can affect the 
changes in different ways.  Countries that are concerned about equity, for example, may want to 
increase their tax rates while those more concerned about efficiency may reduce them.  Whatever 
the motivation behind the high frequency changes, however, one might expect some negative 
feedback for efficiency.  This follows from the fact that a constantly changing tax schedule adds 
uncertainty to the tax system which is likely to increase complexity and reduce efficiency.
10 
The important question for us is whether these changes are simply transitory in nature or 
is there some well defined direction of change.  If changes are being made on the grounds of 
efficiency, then one may expect persistent trends to develop over time as countries try to improve 
the efficiency of their tax structures by reducing rates.  The remainder of the paper will give a 
detailed analysis of the resulting trends that have developed over time. 
4. Top Statutory PIT Rates 
One of the frequently cited variables of any income tax system is the top statutory 
personal income tax (PIT) rate.  This is a legally determined marginal tax rate applicable to the 
top bracket of the income tax schedule.  This particular tax rate has occasionally been used in 
empirical cross-country research as a proxy variable for tax progressivity or as a way of 
assessing the overall excess tax burden (e.g., Johnson, Kaufmann, and Zoido-Lobaton 1998, 
Friedman et al. 2000, among others). 
Figure 1 illustrates how the average top statutory tax rate has dropped considerably over 
the last twenty five years.  This decline was especially pronounced for the GDP-weighted trend
 
                                                 
10 Constantly changing features of the tax schedule cause individuals to be uncertain about their tax liability and thus 
increase compliance and administrative costs (Slemrod 1992).   10
which is more representative of the world economy.
11  One interesting observation is that the 
most dramatic change occurred during the late eighties and early nineties.  The weighted average 
top statutory PIT rate fell from a high of 62% in 1981 to 56% in 1986.  During the ensuing eight 
year period (1986 - 1993), however, the PIT rate plunged by approximately 16 percentage points.  
The PIT rate then increased by a modest 2 percentage points before resuming its downward trend 
in 1996.  Since then, the decline has continued, with average top statutory rates sliding a further 
6.5 percentage points over the next 10 years.  Together these changes represent a sizeable 41.2% 
decline in the weighted top PIT rate from a high of 62% in 1981 to a low of 36.4% in 2005. 
Further evidence in support of the worldwide downward trend is reported in Table 2 
where we observe that only 17% of unweighted top PIT rates were in excess of 40% in 2001-
2005 compared to over 71% during the early 1980s.  The share of countries with top PIT rates in 
excess of 60% plummeted from about a quarter in 1981 to less than 1% in 2005.  The lower non-
zero rates (1% to 40%), on the other hand, became more popular as the percentage of countries 
falling into these categories increased from approximately 15% to over 73% between 1981 and 
2005. 
The reader will notice that there are two changes in the weighted PIT trend that align 
perfectly with well known tax changes in the U.S.  These are the 1986 and 1993 tax reforms 
which reduced and increased the top PIT rates respectively.  The weighted top PIT rate fell by 
approximately 6 percentage points between 1986 and 1987.  Similarly, the 2 percentage point 
increase in the top PIT rate between 1993 and 1994 coincides with the U.S. Budget 
Reconciliation Act enacted in August 1993.
   This casual observation would imply, incorrectly, 
that the larger countries, as measured by GDP, are driving these trends with little or no change 
                                                 
11 The values are weighted by gross domestic product measured in 1990 U.S. dollars.  Underlying numbers are 
reported in Appendix Table A1.   11
taking place elsewhere in the world.  However, the summary statistics presented in Table 3 and 
Figure 2 show clearly that the changes are ubiquitous.  From Table 3, for example, we are able to 
highlight that each country category experienced a significant decline in the GDP-weighted top 
PIT rate.  The greatest decline was among the upper middle income countries, followed by low, 
lower middle and high income countries respectively.  By 2005, upper middle income countries 
had the lowest top PIT rates on average.  The downward trend remains statistically significant 
after controlling for country fixed effects and accounting for serial correlation. 
While the evidence in Panel A proves that the downward movement in top PIT rates was 
universal, the trend coefficients in Panel B also suggest that the major changes appear to be 
sequential.  What started as top tax rate cuts in high income countries during the early and mid 
1980s was spread to middle income countries during the late 1980s and early 1990s before 
eventually reaching low income countries in the late 1990s. 
5. Actual Marginal and Average PIT Rates 
The top statutory PIT rate is generally quoted in impressionistic comparisons of national 
income tax schedules, and, in particular, as a proxy for the tax burden in some empirical 
research.  In a sense, it is easy to see why this rate is so widely used, as it is potentially the 
maximum marginal tax rate facing the wealthiest taxpayers.  However, the top statutory rate in 
less developed economies is often irrelevant to the majority of domestic high earners and 
entrepreneurs, with the exception of the small number of expatriates and wealthiest local elite.  
For example, in high income countries the top statutory PIT rate is applicable, on average, to the 
level of income equivalent to the triple of a country’s GDP per capita.  In contrast, the ratio of 
the top threshold to a country’s GDP per capita is about 18 in upper middle income countries, 47 
in lower middle income countries, and 83 in low income countries.  Thus, it is important to   12
examine the trends in PIT rates at other points of the income distribution that are more relevant 
to the majority of population.  The problem though, is that it is practically unfeasible to find the 
actual income distribution for the large number of countries over the 25-year period.  As an 
alternative, we use a country’s GDP per capita and its multiples as a comparable income base.  
For example, for each country in our sample, we can calculate the marginal rates for the level of 
individual income equivalent to 1, 2, 3, and 4 times GDP per capita by using the national PIT 
scale.
12  
In addition to having rates at different levels of individual earnings, our data also allow us 
to calculate the actual marginal tax rates that are generally more preferred to the statutory rates 
dictated by national tax schedules.  It is not unusual for these two rates to differ significantly.  A 
local tax, national surtax, or additional tax schedules can raise the actual marginal tax rate above 
the officially stated rate.  Personal deductions and tax credits, on the other hand, can lower the 
actual marginal tax rate below the legal rate.  To estimate actual marginal tax rates for each 
country in our sample, we first calculate taxable income for 100 different levels of pre-tax 
income that are evenly spread in the range from 4% to 400% of a country’s GDP per capita.  
Taxable income excludes standard deductions, basic personal allowances, and employee/wage 
allowances, which are unconditionally applicable to all single, employed taxpayers.
13  Next, we 
apply the tax schedule and, whenever relevant, particular tax formulas to the taxable income in 
                                                 
12 This approach was also used by Sicat and Vermani (1988) in comparing marginal rates across 51 developing 
countries. 
13 We use the rates for single taxpayers in calculating taxable income to preserve comparability across countries and 
because most of countries have individual-based tax systems.  Some countries, like the U.S., Germany, Zimbabwe, 
have income tax systems based on the combined family income.  However, because the number of countries with 
separate rates for married individuals is small in our data (8 to 12 in various years), it is unlikely that using rates for 
married taxpayers would alter the aggregate trends.     13
order to compute the tax liability for each income level.
14  The tax liability also includes local 
taxes and major national surtaxes if altogether they exceed 5% of the taxable income.
15  The final 
tax liability figure is adjusted by subtracting the tax credits that are universally applicable to 
single taxpayers.  Finally, the actual marginal rates are calculated as Δ tax liability / Δ income for 
each of the 100 values of gross income.
16   
Using tax liability figures, we also compute the average tax rate as the ratio of total tax 
liability to gross income for each level of income.  It is important to emphasize that the average 
rate is the tax rate that the individual taxpayers face or are supposed to pay under current tax 
laws, not the rate they choose to pay by means of underreporting their income.  As such, the 
average tax rate gives an upper bound on the effective rate paid by individuals under the PIT.  
Figure 3 shows that in any given year the marginal rates are higher than their respective 
average rates and that both average and marginal rates increase with the level of income.  These 
are the two main indications that the personal income tax structure for most of the countries 
remains progressive.  More important for the current discussion, however, are the observed 
trends for the various rates.  Irrespective of the rate chosen, one observes a clear downward trend 
over the sample period.  Furthermore, all of the variables show that the greatest downturn in the 
                                                 
14 In most cases, we apply the standard formula for calculating tax liability, T=(Y-Yr)*tr+R, where Y is taxable 
income, Yr is the largest bracket less than Y, R is the tax liability if taxable income were equal to Yr and tr is the 
marginal tax rate for the r
th bracket.  However, in 418 country-year cases we had to use non-standard country-
specific procedures in computing tax liability.  Countries may have local taxes and multiple surtaxes, an additional 
schedule for salaries (Egypt, Senegal, etc.), or non-standard tax formulas (e.g., Cote d’Ivoire, Denmark, and 
Germany).  For example, federal tax liability in Denmark is calculated as T= Y*t0+(Y-Y1)*t1+(Y-Y2)*t2, where t0 is 
the bottom rate, t1 is the middle rate, t2 is the top rate, Yi is the threshold for each rate and the combined top marginal 
rate is limited to 59% as of 2008.  
15 The methods used to incorporate local taxes vary from using simple average rates (e.g., Denmark, Finland, and 
Sweden) to applying separate local tax schedules such as in Canada (Ontario), Japan, and Switzerland (Zurich). 
16 For the level of gross income equivalent to a country’s GDP per capita, actual and statutory marginal rates are 
approximately the same in 66% cases (within one percentage point deviation), the statutory rate is greater in 29% 
cases, and it is less in 5% cases.  The similarities between actual and statutory rates tend to increase with the level of 
gross income.     14
tax rates took place during the mid to late eighties, with a consistent but moderate decline in the 
subsequent years.   
Also important to note is that there is some amount of convergence between the actual 
rates for higher and lower income levels.  That is, while both high-income rates and low-income 
rates trended downward throughout the sample period, the high-income rates (for the income 
corresponding to quadruple of a country’s GDP per capita) fell at a much faster rate.  For 
example, marginal tax rates (MTR) at y, where y  denotes GDP per capita, fell by -0.49 
percentage points per year whereas MTR at 4⋅y went down by -0.76 percentage points per year; 
the difference in the rates of decline is statistically significant at all conventional levels of 
significance.  A similar convergence result is obtained with respect to the annual decline in 
average rates (-0.32 percentage point decline at y vs. -0.57 at 4⋅y).  This apparent convergence 
could be an indication that the tax reforms have reduced the progressivity of income tax 
structures that we examine further below.  
Thus, if we take a worldwide weighted average, we observe a tendency of national tax 
systems toward lower actual marginal and average PIT rates at different points of the generated 
income distribution, and this tendency seems particularly strong at the higher levels of individual 
earnings.  The unweighted trend is also negative and statistically significant even after 
controlling for country time-invariant heterogeneity and serial correlation (Table 4, Panel B).  
While it is true on average, this conclusion does not hold for the poorest countries.  In Table 4 
we report the estimated trend coefficients by country category at four income levels.  High and 
upper middle income countries have declining actual PIT rates over the 25-year period.  In 
concordance with an earlier observation, the decline in both marginal and average rates was 
stronger for higher levels of individual earnings.  Perhaps the most interesting result in Table 4 is   15
that the least developed countries had either no change or an increase in rates throughout the 
sample period.  These results are not that surprising in light of the evidence presented in the 
previous section on the frequency with which the PIT structure changes.  Since the low income 
countries make very few changes to their bracket thresholds and experience much higher 
inflation than the other groups of countries, it is predictable that the actual rates are increasing 
over time, especially for the upper middle class.
17  Households with below median income are 
often not liable (and not able) to pay any taxes because their income is generally lower than the 
first tax threshold.  Therefore, entrepreneurs and high skilled workers are most likely to be 
victims of the increase in average and marginal rates in the poor countries.
18  
Thus, the trends discussed so far make it clear that the observed downward movement in 
actual PIT rates is influenced significantly by more developed economies. 
6. Trend Toward Simplicity 
In this section, we show that in addition to the downward trend in statutory and actual 
PIT rates, there has also been a consistent drive toward PIT simplicity among the countries of the 
world.  Having a complex tax structure is costly as it is likely to encourage tax evasion and 
unofficial economy transactions.  There are also direct social costs imposed on the society by 
having a complex tax system, including the costs of filing the returns (both time and monetary), 
efforts to calculate deductions and allowances as well as other efforts to reduce taxable income.  
Slemrod and Sorum (1984) show that these direct costs were very high for the U.S. PIT system 
                                                 
17 We found a positive correlation between the number of years since last change in brackets and the change in upper 
average and marginal tax rates (ATR and MTR at 3.y and 4.y), and that this correlation increases with the inflation 
rate.  This finding supports the “bracket creep” explanation of increasing average and marginal rates in an 
inflationary environment. 
18 Higher rates on entrepreneurs could be detrimental to productivity growth and discourage saving and domestic 
investment.  Instead, high earners find ways to avoid saving and domestic investment through immigration, money 
hoarding, spending money on luxury imported items, and investing abroad (Hall and Rabushka 1985).   16
in 1982 consuming approximately 5−7% of tax revenues generated in that year.  There is also a 
tradeoff between simplicity and other characteristics of the tax structure.  This is true especially 
where efforts to distinguish among taxpayers in achieving a more equitable distribution increases 
the complexity of the tax structure (Slemrod 1992).  Therefore, the trend in complexity is 
important since it has implications for both equity and efficiency. 
Measuring the extent of complexity in a tax system is extremely difficult, especially in 
the cross-country setting.  We recognize that our cross-country analysis cannot account for many 
important dimensions of tax complexity such as clarity of tax laws and regulations, costs of tax 
planning and paperwork, time needed to submit declarations, number of exemptions and 
itemized deductions, and other analogous factors, which are hard to measure even for one 
country, much less for many countries.  It is virtually impossible to collect time-varying data on 
these factors for our sample; 189 countries for 25 years.  Despite these limitations, our discussion 
does provide useful and comparable cross-country information on several key dimensions of PIT 
complexity that we are able to quantify for a large number of countries.   
Among those dimensions are the complexity of allowances and tax credits, multiple tax 
schedules, non-standard tax formulas, local taxes, national surtaxes, and the number of PIT 
brackets.  Having no allowances, for example, is considered to be less complex than having 
allowances, while having allowances that depend on the spouse’s employment participation is 
considered more complex than having a standard allowance.
19  Similarly, having a single PIT 
schedule is simpler than having multiple schedules since a single tax schedule eliminates any 
                                                 
19 Personal allowances and tax credits are considered standard if they are applicable to the taxpayer, spouse, and/or 
children without any restricting conditions (such as age, children being at school, spouse not working, etc.).    17
confusion as to which schedule individuals should use when filing their tax returns.
20  Non-
standard formulas for tax computations also add to the tax complexity as they often require extra 
rules, regulations and definitions to make these formulas work (footnote 16 gives an example of 
non-standard tax formulas).  National surtaxes and separate local/provincial PIT rates are other 
obvious factors contributing to complexity.  Finally, the excessive partitioning of personal 
income into multiple tax brackets is often associated with larger administrative and information 
costs and may create additional incentives for manipulating taxable income to move down the 
graduated scale.
21    
Table 5 provides summary statistics for the above indicators of PIT complexity.  We see 
that 53% of countries had non-standard allowances or tax credits in the first five year period of 
the sample, but this number decreased to 40% in the last five year period.  The largest changes 
took place in the first two periods where the share of non-standard allowances fell by 9% and 
14% respectively.  There is also a noticeable decline in the use of surtaxes and high local tax 
rates (defined as 5% of taxable income or greater) and a corresponding increase in the use of low 
local tax rates.  Likewise, the percentage of countries using non-standard tax formulas fell by 10 
percentage points or over 50% between 1981 and 2005.  Unlike the other components, the use of 
multiple schedules increased slightly between the first and second period before also showing a 
steady decline from 22% in the second period to 17% in the last. 
Results in Table 5 also indicate a significant cross-country variation in the characteristics 
of the PIT systems.  From the probit estimates in Panel B, we see that high income countries are 
                                                 
20 Multiple tax schedules include, but not limited to, alternative minimum tax as well as schedules that depend on 
occupation, industry, location, marital status, and other characteristics of a resident taxpayer. 
21 The large number of brackets makes it difficult for taxpayers to know their marginal tax rate and hence to make 
more informed decisions (Slemrod 1992).  It also increases the incentives of taxpayers to play around the multiple 
thresholds in attempt to move down the graduated scale.   18
more likely to have non-standard allowances and tax credits, high local taxes, and non-standard 
tax formulas.  Low income countries, on the other hand, have a higher likelihood of using 
multiple tax schedules, imposing low local taxes, and using standard allowances and tax credits.  
The downward trend depicted by the probit estimation is consistent with the above discussion of 
the mean values by period.  Panel C of Table 5 reports the estimated trend coefficient from the 
linear probability model that controls for country fixed effects and accounts for arbitrary serial 
correlation.  While the overall trend remains negative, it becomes statistically insignificant for 
three indicators (surtaxes, high local taxes, and multiple tax schedules) that could be due to 
limited within-country variation in these measures. 
From Table 6, we find that approximately 50% of the sample had more than 10 tax 
brackets in the 1981–1985 period with approximately 9% having more than 20 brackets, up to 68 
in Guatemala.  This is in comparison to 5.5% and 0.4% in the 2001-2005 period, respectively.  
While the 6-9 range gained marginally, increasing by a total of 3 percentage points, the 1-3 and 
4-5 ranges became the norm.  As of 2005, approximately 55% (23% and 32% respectively) of 
countries fell into these ranges, while the zero range experienced a decline of approximately 5 
percentage points.  Both unweighted and GDP-weighted trends in Figure 4 indicate that the steep 
decline in the average number of tax brackets was worldwide.  Although there was significant 
variation in the number of brackets at the beginning of the sample period, the average number of 
brackets since 1995 has remained around 4-6 for all country categories. 
Thus, we find that the observed indicators of PIT complexity have exhibited downward 
trends over the last quarter century.  The steep drop in the average number of tax brackets, the   19
gradual elimination of surtaxes, and the dwindling use of multiple tax schedules, non-standard 
allowances and tax formulas has moved countries toward simpler PIT structures.
22 
7.  Structural Progressivity 
The evidence so far shows that there has been a significant shift towards more simple 
income tax structures and lower tax burden, especially at the top of the income distribution.  
These changes can justifiably be assumed to have a negative effect on the structural progressivity 
of the income tax system.  The term structural progressivity is introduced by Musgrave and Thin 
(1948) to denote changes in the calculated (nominal) tax burden along the income distribution, as 
opposed to the effective progressivity that depicts changes in actual income inequality. 
In this study, we focus on the structural progressivity of personal income taxes.  We 
believe that the measures of structural progressivity are particularly useful in determining the 
effect of legal changes in PIT schedules on growth, evasion, income inequality, and other 
important outcomes.  Unlike structural progressivity, effective progressivity is directly derived 
from collected revenues and existing income distribution, which makes the identification of the 
causal effect of the effective progressivity on the outcomes from which it is derived highly 
problematic.  Additionally, the data requirements of our approach are far less demanding than 
some of the existing approaches that calculate effective tax rates (Easterly and Rebelo 1993, 
Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar 1994).
23      
                                                 
22 Transition to simpler income tax systems does not necessarily imply the drop in the cost of compliance and tax 
administration.  The costs may increase even if there is a reduction in complexity (Blumenthal and Slemrod 1992, 
Tran-Nam, Evans, and Walpole 2000). 
23 Full implementation of Easterly and Rebelo’s (1993) method requires data on income distribution, statutory tax 
rates, and actual tax revenues collected.  Assumptions about the tax function, the income distribution, and the level 
at which taxes are paid are also required (e.g., taxes are assumed to be paid at the household level and that each 
household has 5 members).  Only 32 countries were included in their analysis due to data requirements.  Although 
Mendoza et al. (1994) rely on fewer parametric assumptions, their approach also requires data that are not readily 
available for many countries.  Detailed data on national accounts (e.g., wages, consumption, operating surplus of the   20
To assess the structural PIT progressivity for each country in the sample, we calculate the 
marginal rate progression (MRP) and average rate progression (ARP).  Unlike Musgrave and 
Thin (1948), whose progressivity measures vary over the income distribution, we develop a 
single, comprehensive measure for each country using the following procedure.  First, we 
compute marginal and average rates for each country and each year at 100 different levels of pre-
tax income that are evenly spread in the range from 4% to 400% of a country’s GDP per capita 
(the calculation process is described earlier in the text).  These variables are then used to 
construct marginal and average rate progression indices (MRP1 and ARP1, respectively) by 
regressing marginal (or average) rates on the log of gross income.  For example, ARP1 for 
Canada in 2005 is the estimated slope coefficient from the regression of average tax rates in 2005 
on the log of gross income using 100 data points that are formed around Canada’s GDP per 
capita.  The tax structure is interpreted as progressive, proportional or regressive if the slope is 
positive, zero, or negative, respectively.  Thus, in order to get a single, comprehensive measure, 
we had to impose a linearity restriction on the relationship between rates and income levels.  In 
an effort to capture some nonlinearity of these measures, we also calculate MRP2 and ARP2 for 
the middle portion of income distribution in the range from 100% to 300% of a country’s GDP 
per capita. 
Table 7, Panel A provides the GDP-weighted means of the progressivity measures over 
the sample period.  We observe that both progressivity measures were positive for the full 
sample period indicating that the tax structures remain progressive despite many reforms.  It is 
also shown that structural progressivity declined over the sample period.  We note, for example, 
                                                                                                                                                             
economy, etc.) and tax revenues (for different sources and at different levels of government) are needed to calculate 
their effective tax rates.  Besides the fact that these data are not available for many countries and years, 
comparability across countries remains an issue where the data are available.  In fact, the authors initially calculated 
their tax measure for G7 countries only and later included 11 additional OECD member countries.   21
that MRP1 fell from 9.98 in 1981-1985 to 6.96 in 2001-2005, while the ARP1 fell from 8.01 in 
1981-1985 to 5.46 in 2001-2005.  When examined on a period basis, in Table 7, we observe a 
noticeable decline in all progressivity measures throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s.  This 
is consistent with our earlier discussion which highlighted these years as periods of significant 
tax reforms.  Panel C shows that after accounting for country fixed effects and serial correlation, 
the average within-country trend for progressivity measures stays negative and for the most part 
statistically significant, with the exception of MRP2 that has large standard errors.   
We also note that the structural progressivity of the income tax system is smaller in the 
middle of the income distribution (MRP2 and ARP2) than for the broader distribution (MRP1 
and ARP1), thus confirming the non-linearity of the progressivity measures.   
Along with the average worldwide trend toward lower structural progressivity, we also 
observe significant variation in the progressivity dynamics across country type.  Panel B in Table 
7 shows that countries that experienced the strongest decline in the progressivity measures 
belong to the high income and upper middle income categories.  The downward trend slope is 
much smaller in lower middle income countries, and the trend is positive and statistically 
significant in the poorest developing economies.  This result is not surprising given our earlier 
finding of an increase in actual tax rates at the top of the distribution in low income countries.   
Thus, data analysis points to personal income tax schedules becoming increasingly flatter 
over time.
24  Whether these changes translated into lower or higher effective progressivity (and 
associated income inequality) remains an open question.  The relationship between structural 
progressivity and effective progressivity is quite complex.  In theory, it is possible for structural 
                                                 
24 This trend is not limited to the personal income tax.  In fact, evidence suggests that corporate income tax 
schedules are also flatter now than they were in the past.  The share of countries with progressive corporate income 
tax schedule declined from 32% in 1981 to just 12% in 2005.  Furthermore, despite some modest variation across 
countries, consumption taxes are generally administered at a single flat rate.     22
and effective progressivity to move in opposite directions following changes in tax rates.   
Musgrave and Thin (1948) showed that a shift to a higher revenue-yielding tax structure that 
maintains the same level of average rate progression at all points of the income distribution will 
cause effective progression to increase.  Furthermore, if the tax reform increases productivity and 
reduces tax evasion, then a reduction in structural progressivity may actually result in higher 
effective progressivity, and hence greater equity, assuming that the redistribution of the increased 
tax revenues is progressive or pro-poor.  But even when redistribution from rich to poor does not 
occur, lower taxes on the rich could in principle decrease true net income inequality if the share 
of hidden income among the rich is large while the elasticity of true income/productivity is small 
relative to the elasticity of hidden income with respect to tax changes (Duncan and Sabirianova 
Peter 2008).   
While we focus on personal income taxes, it is also important to acknowledge the role of 
other taxes in determining the overall effective progressivity of the tax system.  Changes in other 
aspects of the tax system can either reinforce or offset the equity implications of the fall in PIT 
progressivity that we document.  For example, developing countries have increased their reliance 
on consumption taxes while reducing their dependence on tariffs over the period of our study 
(Bahl and Bird 2008).  Because consumption taxes are known to be regressive, the net effect of 
these changes on effective progressivity is likely to be ambiguous for low income countries; 
recall that PIT progressivity increased for the poorest developing countries.  The scientific 
assessment of how reduced PIT structural progressivity may have contributed to the overall 
effective progressivity requires detailed micro-level analysis, which is difficult to implement on 
a large cross-country basis due to significant data requirements.   23
8. Flat Tax Revolution 
The outmost case of zero (or near to zero) structural progressivity deserves special 
consideration.  It occurs when a country has either no tax
25 or a one-rate flat tax that is not 
dependent on where an individual falls in the income distribution.  The case of the flat personal 
income tax rate is particularly interesting as the number of countries introducing the flat tax rate 
is rapidly growing in recent years.
26  The flat tax rate may or may not be accompanied by an 
allowance or an additional zero-rate threshold, which could make progressivity measures 
different from zero.   
Only 1.6% of countries had flat rate income tax schedules during the 1981-1985 period.  
This number doubled to 3.67% over the next ten years and almost quadrupled to 6.23% by 2001-
2005.  By 2005, fourteen countries worldwide have adopted the one-rate personal income tax, 
eleven of which are middle income countries.   
While still in its early stages, the trend toward flatter taxes continues to gather strength as 
the list of countries adopting the flat tax expands.  Since 1994, for example, when Estonia 
adopted the first flat tax in Europe, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Romania, Slovakia, 
Ukraine, and Serbia have all adopted flat tax rate schedules.  This group has increased to 21 by 
2008, as seven more countries (Albania, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Montenegro, 
Poland, and Republic of Macedonia) introduced the flat PIT rate in 2007-2008.   
Despite the increasing popularity of the flat rate, there continues to be significant debate 
among countries about the merits of making the switch to a flat tax.  Gorodnichenko, Martinez-
                                                 
25 The number of countries with zero tax was relatively stable throughout the sample period, between 15 and 17 
countries.  These countries include some of the oil countries (e.g., Brunei Darussalam, Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates, etc.) and famous offshore islands and tax heavens (e.g., Bahamas, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, 
Cayman Islands, etc.). 
26 It should be noted that the flat PIT rate is not a pure flat consumption tax as outlined in Hall and Rabushka (1985).  
Different rates may still apply to capital gains and business income.  The presence of deductions in some countries 
means that the ‘flat’ PIT rate may not be proportional.     24
Vazquez, and Sabirianova Peter (2009), for example, show that the Russian flat tax reform led to 
a significant decline in tax evasion, but only to a small increase in productivity.  This study 
concludes that such reforms could be useful in countries experiencing large tax evasion but the 
governments should not expect a large productivity response.  It could explain why flat tax 
reforms are especially popular among former socialist countries that are plagued by large shadow 
economic activities.  Although there is a need for more work on the equity and efficiency effects 
of the flat tax, it is reasonable to conclude that the long term trend towards lower tax rates and 
broader tax bases may be entering a new era of change where countries move away from their 
conventional stair stepped progressive income tax schedules to simpler, flatter tax structures.   
9. PIT Rates and PIT Revenue 
Having examined the major trends in personal income tax rate structure, the natural 
follow-up question is whether and how these changes influenced collected PIT revenue.  Since 
tax revenue is the product of the tax rate and tax base, determining what happened to collected 
revenues implicitly tells us what happened to the tax base.  Our objective in this section is 1) to 
establish the trend in PIT revenue over the sample period, and 2) to examine the relationship 
between PIT revenue and our tax measures.   
Existing, but limited, data show almost no change in the share of PIT revenue in GDP 
over time.  From Panel A of Figure 5, we observe that the total PIT revenue as a share of GDP 
for OECD countries has been trending slightly downward but stayed in the range of 9% to 11% 
throughout the 1981-2005 period.  A similar pattern is observed in Panel B of Figure 5 where we 
report the trend in the PIT revenue of the central government as a share of GDP for both   25
developed and developing countries.
27  High income countries display a slight downward trend 
in the PIT/GDP ratio, which stays in the range of 6% to 8%.  This is about two thirds of the PIT 
revenue share for the general government that includes both central and local/state/province 
governments.  In developing countries, the central government PIT share in GDP does not have a 
visible trend and has an average range of approximately 1 percentage point for each of the upper 
middle, lower middle and low income country groups.
28  Similar to previous studies, we find that 
the PIT/GDP ratio is significantly higher in more developed countries. 
A more rigorous analysis of these trends is provided in Table 8 where we report the trend 
coefficients for PIT and total income tax revenue to GDP ratios.  While the pooled OLS results 
show a statistically significant decline over the sample period, we find no evidence of a trend in 
both ratios when we include country fixed effects.  Given the overall decline in average PIT rates 
described above, one implication of these results is that the PIT tax base increased over time.  
However, there appears to be some differences across country groups for PIT revenue (but not 
for total income tax revenue).  In particular, we find evidence of a statistically significant within-
country decline in the PIT/GDP ratio for high income countries (the coefficient on Trend in 
column 3).  Lower middle and low income countries, on the other hand, have a modest upward 
trend after controlling for country fixed effects.  These results are very interesting in light of the 
changes in PIT rates described in sections 4 through 7.  In fact, the trends seem to imply that the 
                                                 
27 The data used in Panel A are from OECD.Stat for about 25-29 countries per year.  Panel B uses data from the 
International Monetary Fund’s Government Financial Statistics for non-OECD countries and OECD.Stat for OECD 
countries for 59-80 countries per year. 
28 The ranges are 2%-3%, 1.7%-2.8%, and 0.7%-2% for upper middle, lower middle and low income countries, 
respectively.  These results are consistent with findings elsewhere in the literature.  For example, Bird and Zolt 
(2005), looking at the period 1981 to 1992 for OECD, African, and Asian countries, find similar evidence; personal 
income tax as a share of GDP did not change much.  Using IMF Government Finance Statistics for 28 developing 
countries, Alm and Wallace (2006) report a small increase in PIT collections from 1.9% of GDP in 1986-1988 to 
2.5% of GDP in 1996-1998.   26
lower PIT rates are associated with lower PIT revenue in high income countries and with higher 
PIT revenue in low income countries.     
We explore this finding further by regressing the PIT/GDP ratio on selected tax variables, 
including the top rate, average and marginal rates, and PIT progressivity measures.  The results 
with country fixed effects are reported in Table 9.  Since PIT collection may influence which tax 
rates countries choose, the endogeneity of tax rates does not allow us to make any causal 
interpretations. Still, the estimates of within-country correlation between tax variables and PIT 
collection are quite informative.  Panel A shows that there is a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between all our tax variables and the PIT revenue share.  More 
interesting are the results in Panel B where we interact the tax measures with country category to 
see how the relationship varies with the level of economic development.  The estimates imply 
that the PIT revenue share and tax rates move in the same direction in developed countries.  
However, the interaction terms of tax variables with other country categories are all negative 
though not always statistically significant when standard errors are clustered by country.  For 
poor countries, we find that the interaction effect cancels out the main effect of the top PIT rate, 
marginal tax rate at income equivalent to four times GDP per capita, and both progressivity 
measures (MRP1 and ARP1).  That is, the PIT revenue share is not found to be positively 
associated with higher marginal rates and progressivity measures in low income countries.   
These results do raise additional questions.  The most obvious being why is there such 
difference in the relationship between PIT rates and PIT revenue across country types?  The 
following decomposition may help to answer to this question.  Suppose R/Y is the share of PIT 
revenue in GDP, where revenue, R, is the product of the PIT base, B, and the average PIT rate, τ.  
Then, the response of the PIT/GDP ratio to changes in the tax rate can be written as:     27
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, (1) 
where  τ B ∈ and  τ Y ∈ are the elasticities of the PIT base and GDP in response to the tax rate, 
respectively.  Equation (1) implies that the larger is the PIT base relative to GDP, the stronger is 
the response of PIT revenue to tax changes.  Therefore, one possible explanation for the 
observed weak relationship between the tax rate and PIT revenue in developing countries is that 
their PIT base is small relative to their GDP.  This, in turn, could be due to legal rules restricting 
taxable income, but more likely due to significant informal sector activities.  Given that the tax 
base, by definition, does not include unreported income while GDP often accounts imperfectly 
for some portions of the informal sector (especially since adopting the 1993 System of National 
Accounts), the ratio of the tax base to GDP is likely to be inversely related to the size of the 
shadow economy. 
However, we should not discount the importance of the second term in equation (1), 
() τ τ Y B ∈ − ∈ + 1 .  The difference in the responsiveness of the tax base relative to the 
responsiveness of GDP is another possible reason for the cross-country differences observed in 
Tables 8 and 9.  In other words, tax induced behavioral responses may vary across countries in 
systematic ways that then lead to the observed trends.  
Conventional wisdom in the taxation literature is that timing and accounting-form 
responses of the tax base are generally larger than real responses (Slemrod 1990).  This is 
supported by recent evidence that the productivity response to the Russian flat tax reform was 
small relative to the compliance response (Gorodnichenko, Martinez-Vazquez, and Sabirianova 
Peter 2009).  If the tax base contracts more sizably relative to GDP in reaction to higher tax rates 
due to a large evasion response, as is probably the case in countries with substantial informal   28
economies, then the absolute difference between the elasticities in equation (1) becomes positive,  
0 > ∈ − ∈ τ τ Y B , thus reducing the responsiveness of the PIT/GDP ratio to tax rates.  Again, we 
see the link between the large size of the shadow economy and the weak response of the PIT 
revenue share to tax changes. 
While we cannot perform the formal testing of this hypothesis, we can check if the 
responsiveness of the PIT revenue share to tax rates declines with weaker institutions and, in 
particular, with the level of corruption that is likely to be correlated with the size of the informal 
sector.  The results, reported in Panel C of Table 9, show that the relationship between the tax 
rate and PIT/GDP ratio is positive and statistically significant for countries with very low 
corruption, but the relationship significantly weakens with higher levels of corruption.  These 
results imply that the size of the informal sector may have contributed to the observed weak 
relationship between the PIT revenue and the tax rate in developing countries.   
10. Importance of Large Representative Samples 
We pointed out earlier that one of the contributions of our study is the extensive coverage 
we provide across time and countries.  Most existing studies looking at the effect of taxes on 
economic outcomes tend to focus on a small group of countries (e.g., OECD countries) and thus 
may suffer from sample selection issues.  Our study addresses these issues by providing a dataset 
that is both representative and highly comparable.  In this section we provide a simple analysis 
that highlights the importance of having a large representative sample.  We also show that the 
changing composition of our sample over time has no effect on the trends discussed so far.   
Year to year changes in the number of countries are unavoidable in long panels like ours.  
These changes are mostly due to 1) the lack of data in early years for some countries, and 2) the 
formation of new countries and the dismantling of old ones.  The former mainly affects   29
developing countries while the latter applies primarily to transitional countries that emerged 
following the breakup of communism in the early 1990’s.
29  The number of countries per year in 
our sample starts at 108 in 1981 and steadily increases up to a max of 180 in 2004, with the total 
number of covered countries being 189.  Even at 108 countries, our initial sample is highly 
representative and accounts for approximately 86% of world GDP.  The 1981 sample also 
represents every geographical region of world, and all World Bank income groups.
30  
Nonetheless, it remains informative to examine the impact, if any, of these changes on the trends 
over time.  We test for any such effects by estimating the trend coefficient on tax variables using 
only the initial set of countries and comparing the results with those obtained using the full 
sample.  Any compositional effect should show up as the difference between these two trend 
coefficients.  The results in Table 10 show that there is no statistically significant difference at 
the 5% level in the estimated trend coefficients and hence no compositional effect.
31  These 
findings imply that we can be confident that the results we document in the previous sections are 
not influenced in any significant way by changes in the number of countries over time. 
In addition to the compositional effect, we also emphasize the importance of having a 
large representative panel of countries.  Sabirianova Peter (2008) demonstrates that using panel 
data methods on a sample of 170+ countries switches the sign of the effect of various tax 
variables on the size of the shadow economy from negative in OLS to positive and highly 
                                                 
29 We gathered tax information on countries before and after they breakup to form new countries.  For example, our 
dataset includes information for the USSR from 1983 up to its breakup in 1991.  Data is then collected for all 15 
new countries formed after the breakup for the remainder of our sample.  Other countries that went through breakups 
are treated similarly, e.g., Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Ethiopia (with Eritrea included).      
30 The 1981 sample includes 19 African, 22 Asian/Oceanic, 29 Central/South American and Caribbean, 20 
European, 9 Mid East and 4 North American (includes Bermuda) countries.  Additionally, we have 31, 18, 38 and 
15 High, Upper Middle, Lower Middle and Low Income countries, respectively, in the 1981 sample. 
31 We find statistically significant differences between the trend coefficients at the 10% level only for MRP1 in OLS 
estimations.  In all other cases (including all FE estimations), the trend slopes estimated on the 1981 sample (108 
countries) are not statistically significant at the 10% level from the trend slopes estimated when all countries are 
included.  The results for other tax variables are similar and not reported.   30
statistically significant in fixed effect models.  In this paper, we illustrate the importance of large 
representative samples in the context of a simple GDP growth model.
32  We estimate the effect 
of the top PIT rate on the growth of GDP using several alternative data sources (University of 
Michigan WTD, Heritage Foundation, OECD, World Bank, and the Economist Intelligence 
Unit) and compare the estimates with the estimates from our data (World Tax Indicators).  The 
results from this exercise are reported in Table 11.  We first note that alternative data sources are 
smaller in size and typically under-represent low-income countries (see Panel A).  Panel B 
reports the trend coefficient on the top PIT rate and shows the large variation in sign, size and 
significance by data source.  For example, Heritage Foundation and Economist Intelligence Unit 
databases show no trend in the top PIT rate, OECD and World Bank data sources produce a large 
downward bias in the estimated trend while the WTD shows a relatively steep descending trend 
in top rates.  From Panel C, we see that only our dataset shows a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between the top PIT rate and GDP growth rate.  The estimates of the tax 
rate effect on growth from other data sources are all statistically insignificant.     
These results make it clear that reliance on small unrepresentative samples may lead to 
incorrect inferences and thus affect policy prescriptions.  In this respect, we believe that our 
dataset is superior to most of the existing data on PIT rates. 
11. Conclusion 
This paper introduces a panel dataset on the PIT structure that is highly comparable 
across countries and years, and unprecedented in its coverage.  The dataset includes the measures 
                                                 
32 The growth model includes the top PIT rate, annual change in the share of government consumption expenditures 
in GDP, annual change in the share of gross fixed capital formation in GDP, population growth rate, the share of 
industrial production in value added, year dummies, and country fixed effects to control for a country’s endowment 
in human and physical capital and other time-invariant characteristics.  We use the top PIT rate for comparability 
with other data sources.   31
of structural progressivity as well as average and marginal PIT rates at different points of the 
income scale.  Also included is information on tax brackets, statutory rates, basic allowances, tax 
credits, etc.  These features make our data the desirable source for studies of the relationship 
between tax policy and economic outcomes in a country level setting.   
Using this dataset, we identify and determine the direction of a momentous change in the 
world’s tax systems.  We highlight a tax reform process in which governments have moved away 
from complex, progressive tax systems featuring multiple tax brackets and escalating stair step 
tax rates to simpler, flatter tax schedules distinguished by fewer tax brackets and lower tax rates.  
In fact, taxpayers on average face lower personal income tax rates and simpler rate structures 
than they did twenty five years ago.  This transformation suggests an epic and ubiquitous change 
in fiscal policy.   
As the trends continue to play out, we also see a nascent secondary trend emerging where 
the conventional stair-stepped tax schedule is being replaced by a flat tax rate.  The recent 
acceleration in this trend began with Estonia’s adoption of a flat tax in 1994 and has since spread 
to other post-communist countries.  As noted earlier, the number of countries using flat tax rates 
has soared since 1981 but still remains relatively small at about 12% of the sample countries by 
2007.  However, at the writing of this paper, other countries such as Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Greece, and Mexico are giving a flat tax schedule serious consideration.  It seems to us that the 
trend toward flat taxes is likely to continue for the next several years.  Whether or not this second 
trend continues, exceptional long term changes have already transformed the tax systems of the 
world. 
We also analyzed the relationship between PIT rates and PIT revenue collection and find 
that the relationship varies in important ways across countries.  In particular, we find a   32
statistically significant positive association between tax rates and PIT collection in high income 
countries.  Developing countries, on the other hand, show very weak relationship between tax 
rates and the PIT/GDP ratio.  Our results imply that the size of the informal sector may have 
contributed to the observed weak relationship between the PIT revenue and the tax rate in 
developing countries. 
The observed trends raise a number of questions that we briefly addressed in the current 
paper and hope to address more carefully in future work.  For example, what are the implications 
for efficiency, equity, and growth?  Conceivably, flatter tax structures could reduce the excess 
burden without necessarily sacrificing equity.  Davies and Hoy (2002), for example, argue that 
moving from a graduated tax schedule to a flat tax may improve equity.  Furthermore, flatter, 
simpler tax systems can possibly increase the efficiency of the tax system by broadening the tax 
base as well as improving tax compliance.
33  On the other hand, flatter tax systems can lead to 
less equity as more of the tax burden is redistributed from the wealthier taxpayers to the lower 
and middle income classes.  The effect of these changes on growth is also of grave importance.  
To the extent that efficiency has increased, we might expect a positive effect on growth.  If 
inequality also increased, however, then the effect on growth may be ambiguous.  That is, 
increased inequality arising from the tax reform may or may not lead to increased growth 
(Milanovic 2000, Persson and Tabellini 1994, Perotti 1992, among others).  As such, the net 
effect on equity, efficiency, and growth remains an empirical question.  
                                                 
33 Gorodnichenko, Martinez-Vazquez, and Sabirianova Peter (2009).  Feldstein (1995) demonstrated that the 
sensitivity of taxable income with respect to changes in the marginal tax rate is much larger than can be explained 
by estimated labor supply elasticities.   The implication then is that there are other behavioral responses at work.   33
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Table 1:  Frequency of Changes in PIT Schedule by Period and Country Category 








Income  Total 
Panel A: Share of countries with no yearly changes in statutory rates and thresholds 
1981 – 1985  0.348 0.667  0.735  0.661 0.592 
1986 – 1990  0.298 0.560  0.623  0.671 0.526 
1991 – 1995  0.419 0.525  0.500  0.606 0.506 
1996 – 2000  0.439 0.491  0.545  0.747 0.558 
2001 – 2005  0.378 0.576  0.571  0.782 0.574 
All years  0.383 0.552  0.583  0.711 0.550 
Panel B: Share of countries with yearly changes in both statutory rates and thresholds 
1981 – 1985  0.359 0.117  0.173  0.220 0.227 
1986 – 1990  0.427 0.307  0.239  0.224 0.303 
1991 – 1995  0.199 0.273  0.259  0.257 0.245 
1996 – 2000  0.269 0.202  0.175  0.139 0.198 
2001 – 2005  0.311 0.196  0.186  0.129 0.210 
All years  0.306 0.223  0.210  0.179 0.233 
Panel C: Share of countries with yearly adjusted thresholds but unchanged statutory rates 
1981 – 1985  0.250 0.200  0.071  0.102 0.155 
1986 – 1990  0.258 0.120  0.130  0.059 0.152 
1991 – 1995  0.331 0.152  0.209  0.101 0.207 
1996 – 2000  0.269 0.254  0.245  0.101 0.215 
2001 – 2005  0.272 0.207  0.229  0.082 0.196 
All years  0.277 0.191  0.185  0.090 0.190 
N  703  440 677 581  2401 
 
Notes:  Frequencies are computed on the sample of countries with a complete national PIT schedule in both current 
and previous years.   36
Table 2:  Distribution of Countries by Top PIT Rates 
 
Period 0%  1-20%  21-30% 31-40% 41-60% 61-95% 
1981 – 1985  13.11  5.42  2.80  6.99  46.33  25.35 
1986 – 1990  12.87  8.47  5.70  14.66  47.07  11.24 
1991  –  1995 11.55 10.05 14.13 32.20 29.62  2.45 
1996  –  2000 10.32 11.53 19.78 34.47 22.94  0.97 
2001  –  2005  9.69 15.80 23.30 34.03 16.26  0.92 
 
Note: N=3613.   37
Table 3: Top Statutory PIT Rates by Period and Country Category 







Low Income  Total 
Panel A: GDP-Weighted Top PIT Rates (Mean and Standard Deviation) 
1981  –  1985  58.012 61.111 54.188 52.138 57.936 
 (13.588)  (11.506)  (10.833)  (9.961)  (13.205) 
1986  –  1990  46.494 55.764 48.736 47.085 47.848 
 (15.121)  (14.115)  (11.648)  (6.559)  (14.853) 
1991  –  1995  42.663 37.546 42.242 43.312 42.179 
 (11.347)  (15.018)  (14.118)  (6.737)  (11.823) 
1996  –  2000  42.791 33.206 39.933 36.258 41.456 
  (9.500) (11.768)  (8.731)  (8.582) (10.037) 
2001  –  2005  38.908 29.546 35.818 31.823 37.739 
 (8.327)  (11.549)  (10.647)  (7.001)  (9.149) 
Panel B: GDP-Weighted Average Trend  
1981 – 1985  -1.481*  1.149  -0.367  -1.871*  -1.110** 
  [189] [99] [197] [87] [572] 
1986 – 1990  -3.744**  -3.445**  -1.340*  0.238  -3.408** 
  [205] [108] [202]  [99]  [614] 
1991 – 1995  0.760  -3.313**  -3.220**  -1.332**  0.099 
  [209] [139] [242] [146] [736] 
1996 – 2000  -0.870*  0.241  0.302  -2.528**  -0.814** 
  [240] [149] [208] [227] [824] 
2001 – 2005  -0.862*  -0.590  0.182  -0.467  -0.745** 
  [261] [142] [219] [245] [867] 
All  years  -0.797** -1.752** -0.855** -1.059** -0.892** 
Panel C: Within-Country Trend, FE 
All  years  -0.551**  -0.869** -1.079** -1.294** -0.876** 
  (0.079)  (0.163)  (0.115) (0.199) (0.063) 
 [1104]  [637]  [1068]  [804]  [3613] 
 
Notes:  Panel A reports means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the top PIT rates weighted by GDP in 
constant 1990 U.S. dollars.  Panels B and C report estimated slopes from regressing top PIT rates on the trend 
variable.  In Panel B, the estimates are weighted by GDP in constant 1990 U.S. dollars.  In Panel C, the estimates 
are obtained with country fixed effects and heteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation-robust standard errors (reported 
in parentheses); ** significant at 1% level, * significant at 5% level.  Number of observations is in square brackets, 
and it is the same in all three panels.    38
Table 4: Trend Coefficients for Actual PIT Rates by Country Category 
 









Income  Total 
Panel A: GDP-Weighted Average Trend 
Marginal PIT rate 
1⋅y  -0.491** -0.172  -0.347**  0.054  -0.491** 
2⋅y  -0.623** -0.309** -0.291**  0.037  -0.622** 
3⋅y  -0.731** -0.413** -0.378**  0.335** -0.716** 
4⋅y  -0.796** -0.428** -0.414**  0.716** -0.756** 
Average PIT rate 
1⋅y  -0.329** -0.022  -0.255**  0.037  -0.323** 
2⋅y  -0.431** -0.128*  -0.280**  0.040  -0.431** 
3⋅y  -0.523** -0.218** -0.296**  0.068  -0.520** 
4⋅y  -0.584** -0.274** -0.317**  0.214** -0.573** 
Panel B: Unweighted Within-Country Trend, FE 
Marginal PIT rate 
1⋅y  -0.404** -0.204** -0.131  -0.063  -0.218** 
2⋅y  -0.423** -0.291** -0.084  -0.198  -0.242** 
3⋅y  -0.430** -0.388** -0.084  -0.158  -0.263** 
4⋅y  -0.465** -0.414** -0.154  -0.147  -0.307** 
Average PIT rate 
1⋅y  -0.272** -0.137** -0.067*  -0.038  -0.146** 
2⋅y  -0.341** -0.181** -0.094*  -0.079  -0.183** 
3⋅y  -0.372** -0.244** -0.085  -0.115  -0.207** 
4⋅y  -0.390** -0.282** -0.095  -0.121  -0.226** 
  [1035] [571]  [827]  [649] [3082] 
 
Notes:  Reported are the estimated slopes from regressing marginal and average PIT rates on the trend variable; y is 
a country’s GDP per capita.  In Panel A, the estimates are weighted by GDP in constant 1990 U.S. dollars.  In Panel 
B, the estimates are obtained with country fixed effects and heteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation-robust standard 
errors; ** significant at 1% level, * significant at 5% level.  Number of observations is in square brackets, and it is 
the same in all panels.   39
Table 5:  Complexity Components of PIT Systems by Period 
 
  Allowances/credits Surtax  Local  Taxes  Multiple  Tax 
  Standard  Non - 
Standard    Low High  Schedules Formula
Panel A: Complexity Measures by Period (Mean and Standard Deviation) 
1981  –  1985  0.275 0.527 0.281 0.067 0.093 0.207 0.193 
  (0.447) (0.500) (0.450) (0.250) (0.290) (0.406) (0.395) 
1986  –  1990  0.289 0.482 0.297 0.081 0.092 0.228 0.182 
  (0.453) (0.500) (0.457) (0.272) (0.290) (0.420) (0.387) 
1991  –  1995  0.307 0.413 0.266 0.087 0.080 0.198 0.125 
  (0.461) (0.493) (0.442) (0.282) (0.271) (0.399) (0.331) 
1996  –  2000  0.315 0.404 0.230 0.108 0.067 0.192 0.107 
  (0.465) (0.491) (0.421) (0.311) (0.250) (0.394) (0.309) 
2001  –  2005  0.307 0.397 0.212 0.102 0.069 0.172 0.092 
  (0.462) (0.490) (0.409) (0.302) (0.253) (0.378) (0.289) 
Panel B: Probit Estimates  
Trend  0.001 -0.006**  -0.004**  0.001 -0.002*  -0.003**  -0.005** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Upper  middle  income  0.248** -0.135**  0.049*  0.039** -0.253**  0.027  -0.148** 
  (0.025) (0.025) (0.022) (0.013) (0.019) (0.020) (0.017) 
Lower middle income  0.387**  -0.330**  0.037  -0.057**  …  -0.040*  -0.146** 
  (0.021) (0.023) (0.019) (0.014)    (0.018) (0.015) 
Low  income  0.417** -0.446**  0.038  0.061**  …  0.058** -0.091** 
  (0.023) (0.026) (0.021) (0.012)    (0.019) (0.015) 
Panel C: Within-Country Trend, FE 
Trend  -0.000 -0.006**  -0.002  0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.003** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
N (observations)  3388 3388 3395 3392 3392 3387 3143 
N (countries)  182 182 182 182 182 182 177 
 
Notes:  Panel A reports unweighted, unconditional means with standard deviations in parentheses.  Omitted categories are 
countries with no basic allowances or tax credits and no local taxes.  Panel B reports the results of the probit regression of 
each complexity indicator on the trend variable and country categories, with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in 
parentheses; ** significant at 1% level, * significant at 5% level.  The omitted category is high income countries.  Panel C 
reports the fixed effect linear probability regression of each complexity indicator on the trend variable, with country-
clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.  Number of observations is the same in all panels.   40
Table 6:  Distribution of Countries by the Number of Brackets, %  
 
Period  0  1-3 4-5 6-9  10-19  20+ 
1981 – 1985  15.76  6.30  2.73  25.00  41.18  9.03 
1986  –  1990  14.71 12.10 11.92 25.70 30.17  5.40 
1991  –  1995  13.30 19.41 26.60 26.29 12.68  1.72 
1996  –  2000  11.50 21.65 28.28 28.01  9.74  0.81 
2001  –  2005  11.17 23.54 31.78 27.93  5.19  0.40 
 
Note: N=3613. The zero bracket category applies to countries that do not have a PIT.   41
Table 7:  Structural Progressivity Measures of PIT Systems by Period 
 
Period 
Marginal Rate Progression  Average Rate Progression 
N 
MRP1 MRP2 ARP1  ARP2 
Panel A: GDP-Weighted Progressivity Measures 
1981 – 1985  9.982  8.912  8.011  7.012  459 
  (3.563)  (4.090) (2.877) (2.519)   
1986 – 1990  8.331  7.177  6.906  6.090  517 
  (3.324)  (4.129) (2.514) (2.288)   
1991 – 1995  7.521  7.056  5.909  5.215  624 
  (3.140)  (4.129) (2.381) (2.181)   
1996 – 2000  7.220  5.986  5.788  5.141  734 
  (2.603)  (2.958) (2.376) (2.074)   
2001 – 2005  6.963  5.901  5.461  5.006  748 
  (2.506)  (3.222) (2.293) (2.100)   
Panel B: GDP-Weighted Average Trend  
All  countries  -0.133**  -0.135** -0.117** -0.092**  3082 
High  income  -0.141**  -0.145** -0.116** -0.090**  1035 
Upper  middle  income  -0.141**  -0.162** -0.093** -0.095**  571 
Lower middle income  -0.040**  -0.017  -0.043**  -0.012  827 
Low  income  0.194**  0.090** 0.041** 0.007  649 
Panel C: Unweighted Within-Country Trend, FE  
All countries  -0.045**  -0.031  -0.041**  -0.028*  3082 
  (0.015)  (0.022) (0.010) (0.011)   
 
Notes:  MRP1 and ARP1 are marginal and average tax rate progressions up to an income level equivalent to four 
times y, where y is a country’s GDP per capita; MRP2 and ARP2 are marginal and average tax rate progressions 
for the levels of income between y and 3⋅y.  Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of progressivity 
measures in Panel A are weighted by GDP in constant 1990 U.S. dollars.  Panels B and C report estimated slopes 
from regressing progressivity measures on the trend variable.  In Panel B, the estimates are weighted by GDP in 
constant 1990 U.S. dollars.  In Panel C, the estimates are obtained with country fixed effects and 
heteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation-robust standard errors (reported in parentheses); ** significant at 1% 
level, * significant at 5% level.     42
Table 8:  Income Tax Revenue by Country Type 
 PIT/GDP  All  Income  Taxes/GDP 
  OLS FE  FE OLS FE  FE 
Trend -0.061***  -0.010  -0.052*  -0.088*** -0.026  -0.026 
  (0.022) (0.017) (0.030) (0.029) (0.025) (0.030) 
Upper  middle  income -3.692*** -0.583**  -1.111*  -2.682** -1.329*** -0.721 
  (0.850) (0.283) (0.578) (1.057) (0.444) (0.958) 
Lower  middle  income -4.120*** -0.781*  -1.804** -3.897*** -1.695*** -2.411** 
  (0.799) (0.417) (0.696) (0.980) (0.593) (1.006) 
Low income  -4.985***  -1.402**  -2.608*** -5.050*** -1.750**  -2.569 
  (0.799) (0.616) (0.891) (1.063) (0.773) (1.596) 
Upper middle income  …  …  0.034  …  …  -0.066 
     × Trend      (0.039)      (0.077) 
Lower middle income  …  …  0.079**  …  …  0.027 
    × Trend      (0.036)      (0.044) 
Low income  …  …  0.091**  …  …  0.032 
    × Trend      (0.037)      (0.059) 
Cash vs. accrual  -1.031*  0.371  0.061 -1.828**  -0.610 -0.646* 
  (0.610) (0.274) (0.291) (0.773) (0.419) (0.383) 
Intercept 8.105***  …  …  11.532*** …  … 
 (0.927)      (1.134)     
N  (observations)  1695 1695 1695 1956 1956 1956 
N  (countries)  118 118 118 126 126 126 
R-squared  0.36 0.03 0.07 0.23 0.02 0.04 
Notes: Country-clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses; *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% 
level, * significant at 10% level.  Table reports the results of unweighted regression of income tax revenue as percent 
of GDP on the time trend, country type, and their interaction, controlling for the reporting revenue base (cash or 
accrual). The omitted category is high income countries.  FE = estimator with country fixed effects.  PIT = personal 
income tax. All income taxes are taxes on income, profits, and capital gains payable by individuals and corporations.   43
Table 9:  PIT Rates and PIT Revenue 











Panel A: FE Estimates 
Tax variable  0.018**  0.043*** 0.042*** 0.057*** 0.055***  3.432*  12.897*** 
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (1.782) (4.483) 
R-squared  0.04 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.04  0.06 
Panel B: FE Estimates with Country Type Interactions 
Tax variable  0.047**  0.061*** 0.052*** 0.068*** 0.061***  6.767*  19.537*** 
  (0.019) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (3.484) (5.884) 
Upper  middle  income  -0.033*  -0.024**  -0.024 -0.025 -0.033 -4.597 -6.514 
     × Tax variable  (0.018)  (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.023)  (3.752)  (5.785) 
Lower  middle  income  -0.040*  -0.032*  -0.028 -0.033 -0.033 -4.884  -12.043* 
     × Tax variable  (0.021)  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.027)  (4.337)  (6.854) 
Low income  -0.042*  -0.052*** -0.037  -0.038  0.003  -11.265**  -21.388** 
     × Tax variable  (0.021)  (0.018)  (0.023)  (0.036)  (0.043)  (4.431)  (9.275) 
R-squared  0.07 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.05  0.07 
N  (observations)  1500 1379 1379 1379 1379 1379  1379 
N  (countries)  103  97 97 97 97 97  97 
Panel C: FE Estimates with Corruption Interactions 
Tax variable  0.051***  0.061*** 0.057*** 0.072*** 0.069***  4.356  20.909*** 
  (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (4.357) (6.012) 
Corruption  index  0.297 0.146 0.048 0.050  -0.032  -0.206  -0.000 
  (0.256) (0.169) (0.158) (0.162) (0.146) (0.127) (0.152) 
Corruption  index  -0.014** -0.013** -0.013** -0.015** -0.016*  -0.705  -5.550** 
     × Tax variable  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (1.584)  (2.587) 
R-squared  0.09 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.05  0.07 
N  (observations)  1244 1165 1165 1165 1165 1165  1165 
N  (countries)  92 87 87 87 87 87  87 
Notes: Country-clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses; *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% 
level, significant at 10% level.  Table reports the results of unweighted regression of PIT revenue as percent of GDP 
on the time trend, country type, and variables shown in the table, controlling for the reporting revenue base (cash or 
accrual). The omitted category is high income countries.  All estimates include country fixed effects.  MTR = marginal 
PIT rate; ATR = average PIT rate; MRP1 and ARP1 are marginal and average tax rate progressions up to an income 
level equivalent to four times y, where y is a country’s GDP per capita.  The number of observations is the same in 
Panels A and B.  Corruption index is taken from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) but it is rescaled from 1 
to 6, where 6 indicates worse corruption.     44
Table 10:  Sensitivity of Trend Estimates to Changing Composition of Countries 
  OLS   FE 
  All 1981    All 1981 
  Countries Sample   Countries Sample 
Top PIT rate  -0.796**  -0.867**  -0.876**  -0.849** 
  (0.080) (0.067)  (0.063) (0.068) 
  [189/3613] [108/2612]  [189/3613] [108/2612] 
Chi
2 test for difference 
between coefficients  p-value=0.128    p-value=0.322 
Marginal PIT rate at 4⋅y  -0.308** -0.289**  -0.307** -0.299** 
  (0.087) (0.074)  (0.060) (0.066) 
  [175/3082] [105/2353]  [175/3082] [105/2353] 
Chi
2 test for difference 
between coefficients  p-value=0.667    p-value=0.621 
MRP1 × 100  -0.055**  -0.037**  -0.045**  -0.042** 
  (0.020) (0.019)  (0.015) (0.016) 
  [175/3082] [105/2353]  [175/3082] [105/2353] 
Chi
2 test for difference 
between coefficients  p-value=0.088    p-value=0.540 
Notes: Country-clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses; ** significant at 1% level, * significant 
at 5% level.  Number of countries/observations is reported in brackets.  Table reports the unweighted 
estimates of the slope coefficient from regressing selected tax variables on the trend variable using the 
sample indicated at the top of each column.  The 1981 sample includes countries with available data in 
1981.   45
Table 11: Sensitivity of Estimates to Different Data Sources 













Panel A: Composition of Countries, % 
Low  income  15.31 12.26 13.78  0.00  8.41  1.53 
Lower  middle  25.05 25.11 20.51  0.00 17.29 14.80 
Upper  middle  24.63 25.58 27.88  6.78 28.04 23.47 
High  income  35.01 37.05 37.82  93.22 46.26 60.20 
N  (observations)  3613  1892  312 177 647 196 
Panel B: Trend Coefficient for Top PIT Rate 
Trend  -0.876** -1.220** -0.528  -0.658** -0.520**  0.159 
  (0.063) (0.099) (0.496) (0.134) (0.114) (0.495) 
N  (observations)  3613  1892  312 177 647 196 
N  (countries) 189  134  158 30 127 58 
N (years)  25  23  2  6  6  4 
Panel C: Effect of Top PIT Rate on GDP Growth 
Top PIT rate  -0.076**  -0.016  -0.016  0.076  -0.060  0.016 
  (0.025) (0.021)  (0.067)  (0.064) (0.052) (0.048) 
N  (observations)  3018  1619  297 177 588 196 
N  (countries) 168  119  152 30 114 58 
N (years)  24  22  2  6  6  4 
Note: Country-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses; ** significant at 1% level, * significant at 5% level.  
Panel B reports the unweighted estimates of the slope coefficient from regressing top PIT rates on the trend variable 
using the data sources indicated at the top of each column.  Estimation is done by OLS with country fixed effects. Panel 
C presents the estimates of the relationship between the top PIT rate and real GDP growth rate using data from different 
sources.  The growth model controls for the annual change in the share of government consumption expenditures in 
GDP, the annual change in the share of gross fixed capital formation in GDP, the population growth rate, the share of 
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Figure 2: Top Statutory PIT Rate by Income Group, 1981-2005
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Figure 3: Actual PIT Rates, 1981-2005
 
Notes:  Both marginal and average rates are weighted by GDP in constant 1990 U.S. dollars; y denotes the level of 
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Figure 4: Number of Brackets by Income Group, 1981-2005
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Figure 5: PIT Revenue as % of GDP, 1981-2005
 
 
Notes: Both panels report unweighted means by year.  Panel A is based on the OECD Data Source for the general 
government that includes central as well as local and state governments.  All income taxes are taxes on income, 
profits, and capital gains.  The number of OECD countries ranges from 24 in 1981 to 29 in 2005 for all income 
taxes and 25 in 1981 to 29 in 2005 for PIT.  Panel B is based on the OECD Data Source and IMF Government 
Finance Statistics for the consolidated central government only.  The number of countries in Panel B ranges from 
59 to 80 per year.     51
Appendix 
 
Table A1:  Summary Statistics of Main PIT Variables by Year 
  Unweighted   Weighted
  Top PIT 
Rate 
 Top  PIT 
Rate 
Number of 
Brackets  MRP1 ARP1 
1981  46.775    62.009 14.674  0.110  0.084 
  (23.775)    (14.006) (6.570)  (0.042) (0.032) 
1982  48.192    57.265 13.245  0.096  0.080 
  (23.364)    (13.796) (6.340)  (0.034) (0.029) 
1983  47.913    57.918 12.984  0.098  0.079 
  (23.219)    (13.440) (6.477)  (0.034) (0.028) 
1984  45.930    56.736 12.503  0.098  0.078 
  (23.469)    (12.289) (6.256)  (0.034) (0.027) 
1985  45.102    56.503 12.413  0.099  0.080 
  (22.959)    (12.234) (6.199)  (0.035) (0.027) 
1986  44.083    56.280 12.246  0.097  0.078 
  (22.511)    (12.183) (5.994)  (0.033) (0.027) 
1987  41.307    50.635 8.732  0.088 0.073 
  (21.851)    (13.054) (5.631)  (0.031) (0.026) 
1988  40.323    47.153 6.760  0.079 0.066 
  (21.135)    (15.881) (3.806)  (0.031) (0.024) 
1989  39.238    44.139 6.104  0.077 0.065 
  (20.771)    (15.195) (3.740)  (0.033) (0.024) 
1990  37.372    42.345 5.818  0.078 0.065 
  (19.527)    (13.471) (3.646)  (0.034) (0.023) 
1991  36.139    42.937 5.534  0.078 0.062 
  (19.105)    (12.807) (3.712)  (0.035) (0.022) 
1992  34.977    41.566 5.260  0.078 0.061 
  (18.234)    (12.714) (3.747)  (0.033)  (0.024) 
1993  34.047    40.689 5.108  0.076 0.060 
  (17.306)    (12.223) (3.528)  (0.034) (0.025) 
   52
Table A1 Cont’d:  Summary Statistics of Main PIT Variables by Year 
 
  Unweighted   Weighted
  Top PIT 
Rate 
 Top  PIT 
Rate
Number of 
Brackets  MRP1 ARP1 
1994  33.401    42.830 5.333 0.076 0.060 
  (16.709)    (10.800) (2.758) (0.030) (0.024) 
1995  33.024    42.786 5.554 0.067 0.052 
  (16.198)    (10.478) (2.765) (0.024) (0.023) 
1996  32.813    42.894 5.362 0.072 0.058 
  (16.257)    (10.331) (2.715) (0.026) (0.023) 
1997  32.785    42.463 5.195 0.074 0.058 
  (15.954)    (10.370) (2.091) (0.027) (0.024) 
1998  32.657    41.972 5.052 0.073 0.058 
  (15.875)    (10.367) (1.910) (0.028) (0.024) 
1999  32.335    40.271 4.907 0.072 0.057 
  (15.627)    (9.589) (1.876) (0.027) (0.024) 
2000  31.910    39.936 4.851 0.070 0.058 
  (15.463)    (9.331) (1.855) (0.023) (0.024) 
2001  31.224    39.346 5.049 0.069 0.055 
  (15.159)    (9.328) (1.883) (0.023) (0.022) 
2002  30.593    38.727 5.103 0.070 0.058 
  (14.772)    (9.225) (1.864) (0.024) (0.024) 
2003  29.914    37.353 5.073 0.070 0.055 
  (14.720)    (9.106) (1.853) (0.025) (0.023) 
2004  29.825    37.062 5.050 0.072 0.054 
  (14.611)    (9.085) (1.862) (0.028) (0.024) 
2005  29.011    36.434 5.031 0.068 0.052 
  (14.492)    (8.815) (1.869) (0.024) (0.022) 
N  3613    3613 3143 3082  3082 
 
Notes:  Standard deviations are in parentheses.  Weight is GDP in constant 1990 U.S. dollars.  
MRP1 and ARP1 are marginal and average tax rate progressions up to an income level equivalent 
to four times GDP per capita.  All variables are described in the text.   
 